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INSTITUTIONAL LESSONS FROM 
THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
ELIZABETH GARRETT* 
 Although scholarly and media attention in the wake of the presi-
dential election of 2000 has focused primarily on its unusual aspects, 
such extraordinary events also lead us to analyze aspects of our legal 
and political systems that we tend to take for granted when elections 
run smoothly.1 Among the latter set of lessons that can be drawn 
from the contest between George W. Bush and Al Gore are conclu-
sions about the dynamic and complex relationships among our insti-
tutions of governance. In this Essay, I will discuss two related issues 
of institutional design and institutional choice that have applicability 
beyond the most recent presidential contest. 
 First, the Bush-Gore election concretely illustrates that institu-
tional design is a crucial consideration in determining which part of 
the government is best suited to render particular decisions. When 
institutions must become involved in majoritarian political decisions 
such as the selection of a President, it may be better to rely largely 
on the political branches than on the judiciary for several reasons. 
This allocation of decisionmaking authority is preferable because of 
the greater democratic credentials of Congress. As Justice Breyer put 
it in the context of the 2000 election, “Congress, being a political 
body, expresses the people’s will far more accurately than does an 
unelected Court. And the people’s will is what elections are about.”2 
 In addition, there is a less-often recognized advantage of institu-
tional design enjoyed by the legislature. In some cases presenting 
highly charged political questions, the legislature can adopt proce-
dural frameworks to shape decisionmaking and restrain partisan op-
portunism before a particular controversy arises. In the case of the 
2000 election, the United States Congress actually had a framework 
in place that would have allowed it to handle any challenges to the 
                                                                                                                    
 * Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I appreciate the invaluable 
comments of Andrei Marmor, Eric Posner, and Adrian Vermeule, the excellent research 
assistance of Crista Leahy, and the financial support of a gift of Thomas and Katherine 
Eggemeier, the James H. Douglas Fund for the Study of Law and Government, and the 
Law and Government Program Endowment, all at the University of Chicago Law School. 
 1. The authors of both lead articles in this section of the symposium have drawn at-
tention to elements of a presidential election usually overlooked. Luis Fuentes-Rohwer and 
Guy-Uriel Charles relate the design of the Electoral College to democratic principles. Luis 
Fuentes-Rohwer & Guy-Uriel Charles, The Electoral College, the Right to Vote, and Our 
Federalism: A Comment on a Lasting Institution, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 879 (2001). San-
ford Levinson and Ernest Young pay close attention to an overlooked constitutional 
amendment and discuss the appropriate roles for various institutions of governance in the 
selection of a president. Sanford Levinson & Ernest A. Young, Who’s Afraid of the Twelfth 
Amendment?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 925 (2001). 
 2. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 155 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
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Florida election that lingered after state institutions had played their 
parts. Long before the country learned that the race between George 
W. Bush and Al Gore would be too close for the electoral system to 
handle smoothly, Congress had passed the Electoral Count Act.3 This 
set of procedures would have structured political discourse and deci-
sions so as to channel and constrain partisanship and opportunistic 
behavior. More importantly, the framework would have ensured that 
decisions were made transparently so voters could have held politi-
cians accountable both for their ultimate decision and for the manner 
in which they reached it. 
 In contrast, careful study of the Supreme Court’s early interven-
tion into the 2000 election reveals the greater possibility for strategic 
behavior when an institution acts ex post with relatively full infor-
mation about how its decisions will affect particular and concrete in-
terests. The presidential election thus provides on the federal level 
both an example of ex ante rules—the Electoral Count Act—and an 
example of ex post decisionmaking—the judicial interventions into 
the political process. While the former contained gaps because its 
drafters did not foresee all the problems that could arise in a presi-
dential election, the latter provided substantial leeway for opportun-
istic behavior designed to advance the Justices’ preferences. In the 
second portion of this Essay, I will describe the interplay between the 
United States Supreme Court and the Florida Supreme Court, where 
the Federal Court decisively outmaneuvered the state supreme court 
in order to advance the outcome preferred by a majority of the U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices. 
I 
 Rules that shape decisionmaking are seldom neutral in their ef-
fects; in many cases, the selection of one procedure rather than an-
other will significantly affect and sometimes determine which out-
come will emerge from the process. Once an issue becomes concrete 
enough for participants to be fully aware of their interests, they will 
work to choose rules that will advance their substantive interests. In 
contrast, if procedures can be specified before it is clear what issues 
will be considered and how participants will be affected, then the 
rules can be designed to further longer-term, more public-regarding 
objectives. Because decisionmakers act behind a partial veil of igno-
rance when they adopt ex ante procedural frameworks, their incen-
tive to behave in self-interested ways is reduced.4 So, for example, 
                                                                                                                    
 3. See 3 U.S.C. §§ 1-18 (1994); see also John W. Burgess, The Law of the Electoral 
Count, 3 POL. SCI. Q. 633 (1888) (explaining the Act and discussing its legislative history). 
 4. For the classic statement of the veil of ignorance concept, see JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE 118-23 (rev. ed. 1999); see also Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be 
Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive Influence in Political Institutions, 88 MICH. L. 
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the congressional budget process framework—which is adopted be-
fore any particular spending or taxing decisions are made and ap-
plies for several years into the future—works to facilitate macro-
budgetary goals like smaller federal deficits or better priority-
setting.5 Agreement on such collective goals is more difficult if inter-
ested groups concretely understand, at the time an overarching 
budget framework is adopted, how reductions in federal spending 
will affect the government benefits they enjoy. 
 The partial veil of ignorance strategy is especially likely to suc-
ceed in reducing self-interested behavior when those affected are re-
peat players whose interests are likely to change over time. In the 
budget process, some interest groups may seek to enact subsidies in 
some years and to block enactment of subsidies for competitors in 
other years. Or they may hope to repeal laws in the short-term but to 
protect some laws from repeal in the longer-term. Thus, a particular 
set of rules may advance their objectives in some cases but hinder 
them in others. Under such conditions of uncertainty, players are 
more likely to favor relatively neutral procedures that do not skew 
outcomes in one direction. 
 On the other hand, special rules that structure deliberation in the 
House of Representatives of particular identified bills are usually 
written by the majority party to ensure the defeat of hostile amend-
ments and to make passage of the legislation more likely—perhaps 
by protecting members from politically difficult votes.6 Thus, the spe-
cial rule might require a certain order of amendments, not because 
the process would be fairer to all parties, but because the process is 
very likely to result in enacting a bill favored by majority party lead-
ers. Even with ex post procedures like these, however, strategic be-
havior is somewhat constrained. The Rules Committee, the parlia-
mentarians, and both houses of Congress make procedural decisions 
in the context of a system of precedents, which are not as binding as 
judicial precedents but which do act as restraining norms and guide-
lines. Past precedents rule some decisions out of bounds, and the re-
alization that current decisions will act as precedents in the future 
                                                                                                                    
REV. 917, 966-68 (1990) (applying a concept similar to the one I use here in analysis of the 
political process); Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 
YALE L.J. 399, 399 (2001) (discussing how ex ante constitutional rules can prevent self-
interested decisionmaking that arises when the decisionmaker knows both his own iden-
tity and “the distribution of [future] benefits and burdens that will result from a decision”). 
 5. See Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal 
Budget Process, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 387, 409-12 (1998). 
 6. See STANLEY BACH & STEVEN S. SMITH, MANAGING UNCERTAINTY IN THE HOUSE 
OF REPRESENTATIVES: ADAPTATION AND INNOVATION IN SPECIAL RULES 38-87 (1988) (dis-
cussing rise of special rules in the House); BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: 
NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 2-3 (2d ed. 2000) (describing how spe-
cial rules and omnibus legislation are designed to insulate members from politically diffi-
cult votes). 
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provides them some flavor of ex ante decisionmaking. Furthermore, 
lawmakers must publicly explain their procedural decisions in politi-
cally palatable terms, and the “civilizing force of hypocrisy”7 reduces 
the ability of lawmakers to give into naked opportunism that cannot 
be explained plausibly in other terms. 
 Of course, the line between decisionmaking structures constructed 
ex ante and procedures adopted ex post is not entirely clear. As the 
discussion above reveals, some ex post decisions have elements of ex 
ante decisionmaking because they will determine not only the out-
come of the immediate dispute, but they will also serve as precedents 
that will shape the future. As long as parties are not certain of their 
interests and positions in the future, they cannot be sure how the 
precedent they establish will affect them, nor how easy it will be to 
persuasively distinguish future situations from the current contro-
versy. Similarly, ex ante frameworks will inevitably face some 
amount of ex post influence. No ex ante procedural framework will be 
fully specified, and the necessity of applying the general framework 
to specific decisions that must be made under it allows for strategic 
behavior. The more general or vague the ex ante procedure, the more 
room there is for ex post manipulation. For example, politicians and 
interest groups can interpret and apply the congressional budget 
rules in a number of self-interested ways once they have a clear pic-
ture of how their concrete interests will be affected. Legislative pro-
visions can be written to evade the discipline of the budget rules, or 
the rules can be waived or ignored when they would prohibit legisla-
tors from reaching outcomes they strongly favor.8 But the procedures 
nonetheless act to channel partisan and strategic behavior and to 
constrain it somewhat. 
 Although ex ante procedures may improve decisionmaking and 
policy outcomes in some circumstances, they suffer from limitations. 
Most seriously, ex ante rules must be constructed when drafters have 
incomplete information about the circumstances in which they will 
be applied. A partial veil of ignorance hides not only the information 
relevant to discerning self-interest, but it also denies drafters a great 
deal of helpful information necessary for precise tailoring.9 Thus, ex 
ante procedures are often vague and open-textured relative to rules 
adopted ex post when more complete data is available. In all cases, 
                                                                                                                    
 7. Jon Elster, Alchemies of the Mind: Transmutation and Misrepresentation, 3 LEGAL 
THEORY 133, 176 (1997). 
 8. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 437-60 
(3d ed. 2001) (discussing timing gimmicks to evade discipline and recent provisions 
adopted to waive spending caps and other rules entirely). 
 9. See Vermeule, supra note 4, at 428-29 (discussing information-neutrality       
trade-off). 
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institutions must balance the need to guard against strategic behav-
ior through use of the partial veil of ignorance and the need to draft 
more specific and detailed rules. In some cases, the ex ante guide-
lines are necessarily so general that all the key decisions are post-
poned until after a controversy arises, and therefore the benefits of 
ex ante rules are lost. 
 The choice between ex ante frameworks to constrain future deci-
sions and structures that allow more discretion after facts and cir-
cumstances are fully known depends upon several considerations. 
The greater the specificity that is possible when drafters operate be-
hind the partial veil of ignorance, the greater the likelihood that such 
rules will reduce self-interested behavior in future deliberation and 
decisionmaking. However, the information that allows drafters to 
craft more detailed ex ante frameworks may also allow them to dis-
cern their self-interest and to act strategically. In addition, the speci-
ficity provided in the rule may deny policymakers needed flexibility 
when they face problems that were not accurately anticipated.  
 In short, there are inherent tensions in the choice between ex ante 
and ex post rulemaking. One tension derives from the need for an 
opaque partial veil of ignorance to protect against self-interest and 
the competing need for sufficient information to allow drafters to de-
vise effective and specific rules. Another tension arises from the need 
for ex ante specificity to avoid opportunism in the future and the 
competing need for flexibility to take account of unforeseen develop-
ments in the future. These tensions must be resolved in each case, 
considering the amount of information, the possibility of significant 
changes in the future that cannot be anticipated beforehand, the in-
tensity of the preferences of the players, and the likely effects of deci-
sions driven by self-interest. 
 A presidential election, along with any ensuing protests, contests, 
or other disputes, is a prototypical example of a decision that is best 
made according to rules and procedures determined long before the 
identities of the two candidates are known.10 Otherwise, decisions 
will inevitably be seen by the public as partisan. This perception is 
apt to be accurate in some cases because many decisions relating to a 
contested presidential race will doubtlessly result from partisanship 
rather than from principle. In this context, then, the likelihood of 
                                                                                                                    
 10. See Fuentes-Rohwer & Charles, supra note 1, at 902 (“If the rules of the game are 
described ex ante and the parties play by these rules, then any outcome is by definition le-
gitimate.”). But see John Harrison, Nobody for President, 17 J.L. & POL. (forthcoming Nov. 
2001) (manuscript at 23) (concluding that a “non-norm” would create “enormous pressure 
to devise a mechanism that will garner widespread acceptance” and encourage “compro-
mise, consensus, and the pursuit of legitimacy”). It is worth noting that although Harrison 
and I reach different conclusions about the wisdom of adopting an ex ante procedure rather 
than relying on ad hoc mechanisms, we share a conviction that politicians could have risen 
to the challenge of a contested presidential election. 
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self-interested behavior is virtually guaranteed, but it can be reduced 
if institutions adopt fairly specific ex ante rules using information 
about what can go wrong in elections. We have even had experience 
with contested presidential elections and disputes over votes in the 
Electoral College, so the general information about elections is fairly 
complete without threatening to undermine the partial veil of igno-
rance. Notwithstanding the possibility and promise of decisionmak-
ing shaped by the rules, in the 2000 presidential election the Su-
preme Court selected the President by formulating and applying a 
new rule of decision at a time when the Justices were well aware how 
each of their decisions would affect the fates of the Republican and 
Democratic candidates.  
 Although the Constitution’s equal protection guarantee was 
adopted long before the presidential dispute in 2000, it is so open-
textured and vague that virtually all the specification occurs when it 
is applied to particular cases. As an ex ante framework, it is essen-
tially all gap to be filled in the future. Not only did the Court articu-
late its specification of equal protection for the first time in this case, 
but it also explicitly limited the doctrine’s applicability to the case be-
fore it, evading the protection against self-interested decisionmaking 
that generality in rules can provide.11 
 The Supreme Court’s eagerness to become involved in the election 
contest is particularly unfortunate because the institution arguably 
charged with determining the outcome of a disputed presidential 
election12—the United States Congress—actually had an ex ante 
framework in place that would have shaped its deliberation had ob-
jections to Florida’s electors been made on January 6, 2001. I have 
described that framework previously: 
The Electoral Count Act is designed to provide a framework to 
structure debate, deliberation, and decisionmaking to avoid the 
debacle of the Hayes-Tilden election of 1876. . . . Adopting a struc-
ture for deliberation and decisionmaking before it will be used and 
at a time when it is not clear what particular interests will benefit 
from certain procedural choices and what interests will be harmed 
is a strategy often relied on to reduce partisanship and opportunis-
tic behavior. One of the difficulties in 1876 was that Congress es-
                                                                                                                    
 11. See Vermeule, supra note 4, at 418. 
 12. See Levinson & Young, supra note 1, at 954-64 (discussing whether the power to 
resolve elections is constitutionally committed to Congress). Compare Burgess, supra note 
3, at 633-34 (stating view of Congress’s role in settling presidential disputes), and Richard 
D. Friedman, Trying to Make Peace With Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 811, 859 
(2001) (noting and accepting that “Congress has always understood that the sole responsi-
bility for determining the electoral vote is lodged within it”), with Harrison, supra note 10, 
(manuscript at 3-12) (arguing that the Constitution does not grant Congress the authority 
to judge electoral votes—and indeed that no institution is given that authority in the 
Constitution). 
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tablished the Election Commission after the election dispute had 
arisen and the stakes were clear and concrete. Each decision was 
suffused with partisanship because supporters of Hayes worked to 
advance his interests, as the supporters of Tilden worked to ad-
vance his. In the aftermath of that controversy, legislators wisely 
sought to avoid a repeat by ex ante specification of procedures that 
would channel political behavior.13 
 The legislators who worked to pass the Electoral Count Act, with 
its ex ante specification of the rules of any future presidential elec-
tion contest, were aware of the benefits of such a procedural frame-
work. Senator Sherman observed that one advantage of ex ante 
specification is that the design could be constructed “upon some basis 
of principle” because Congress was acting long before another con-
tested presidential election and at a time that the makeup of the 
House and Senate ensured that neither of the parties would have 
disproportionate influence over the legislation.14  
 The preference for using rules determined before a particular con-
test ensues is reflected in the provisions of the Electoral Count Act. 
For example, section 5, the safe harbor provision, gives special 
weight to “laws enacted prior to the day fixed for the appointment of 
the electors.”15 One representative explained this requirement in 
terms consistent with my analysis: “I think that it would be wise if 
the contest should be made in the face of existing law rather than 
that the law should be made in the face of the existing contest.”16 
 The adoption of the Electoral Count Act illustrates that legislators 
will sometimes resort to the partial veil of ignorance strategy, which 
they know will deny them opportunities for self-interested behavior 
in the future, after a crisis has convinced them and their constituents 
that the restrictions of an ex ante framework are required to avert 
similar difficulties in the future. To put it another way, self-
interested actors came to believe that a pre-commitment device was 
the lesser of two evils. Adding to the attraction of the partial veil of 
ignorance approach in this particular case was the fact that the poli-
ticians involved in drafting and enacting the Electoral Count Act 
knew they were unlikely to face a contested presidential election 
again during their careers. Thus, they were constraining the behav-
                                                                                                                    
 13. Elizabeth Garrett, Leaving the Decision to Congress, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, 
AND THE SUPREME COURT 50-52 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001) (foot-
notes omitted). 
 14. 17 CONG. REC. 815 (1886). 
 15. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994).  
 16. 18 CONG. REC. 47 (1886) (remarks of Rep. Cooper); see also Samuel Issacharoff, 
Political Judgments, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 13, 
at 65 (suggesting that section 5 can be understood “as codifying an important principle of 
electoral democracy requiring the rules of engagement to be explicated ex ante and to be 
fairly immutable under the strain of electoral conflict”). 
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ior of their successors, and probably of successors far in the future, 
who would be dealing with a presidential election contest long after 
those who passed the Act had retired or died. 
 The Electoral Count Act’s framework is by no means perfect; it 
has gaps that could have undermined its effectiveness and that 
would have required some ex post amplification. Some of its gaps 
were probably inadvertent, caused by the limited ability of its draft-
ers to anticipate all of the problems that might arise in an election 
contest. For example, how should Congress react to the following set 
of circumstances that might well have emerged from Florida? The 
Governor certifies the slate of electors for the Republican candidates 
on the basis of the certified results of the election. The state supreme 
court orders a recount. The Democratic party’s electors win after the 
recount,17 which causes the state supreme court to order the 
Governor to withdraw the first slate and send the second slate of 
electors to Washington, D.C. The Governor refuses—perhaps risking 
being held in contempt or some other sanction by the state supreme 
court. Finally, the state legislature enters the picture by ordering the 
Governor not to comply with the court order and to maintain his cer-
tification of the Republican electors. Which slate of electors should be 
considered as “the electors whose appointment shall have been certi-
fied by the executive of the State,”18 in a case in which the House and 
Senate cannot agree after an objection has been lodged?19 Other gaps 
in the Electoral Count Act are the result of doubts concerning how 
far the Act could go constitutionally in influencing the internal state 
electoral processes.20 And some gaps are intentional because the 
drafters wanted to preserve some domain for partisanship and poli-
tics, albeit in a more structured setting. 
 Thus, the 2000 election provides a concrete example of the possi-
bility of Congress taking advantage of its institutional capabilities 
and turning to a structure that had been passed previously to shape 
decisionmaking about a very difficult political issue. It was preparing 
to conduct what would surely have been a highly charged and often 
partisan debate within this framework that could not be repealed or 
ignored without political cost. What broader lessons can be drawn 
                                                                                                                    
 17. It now appears that under most recount standards, Bush would have continued to 
win the Florida election. See John M. Broder, Counties Can’t Account For All Ballots Re-
ported in 2000, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2001, at A16. 
 18. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994) (providing the final decision rule).  
 19. See Friedman, supra note 12, at 863-66 (describing how he thinks this scenario 
would have been resolved under the Electoral Count Act). 
 20. See, e.g., Erika V. Wayne, Robert Crown & Pamela Karlan, The Triumph of 
Expedience: How America Lost the Election to the Courts, HARPER’S MAG., May 2001, at 31, 
32 (interview with Richard Posner, who calls the Electoral Count Act “an ambiguous stat-
ute . . . which is itself of dubious constitutionality”). 
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from this example? First, as I have argued elsewhere,21 the presence 
of the ex ante framework, among other things, would have averted 
any political or constitutional catastrophe had the dispute lingered 
on until January 6, 2001. Others have defended the Supreme Court’s 
repeated intervention into the election contest as a courageous move 
to save the country from crisis—courageous because the Justices 
adopted an aggressive role at some risk to the reputations of their in-
stitution and themselves. Such fears of a political disaster are over-
stated, and they reflect an elitist distrust of the relatively messy 
arena of politics. Congress would not have discharged its responsibil-
ity to determine any election contest without some amount of heated 
rhetoric, opportunistic behavior, and partisan wrangling. However, 
having long ago made the trade-off between the advantages and dis-
advantages of adopting an ex ante procedural framework in favor of 
enacting a fairly specific Electoral Count Act to provide the rules of 
decision, Congress had the ability to apply that framework in a 
transparent and accountable way. 
 While others, including the dissenting Justices,22 have worried 
that the Court’s decision to play a substantial role in the selection of 
the forty-third President will damage its long-term reputation, my 
concern focuses on the damage to the legislative branch. When 
judges work so hard to keep a case away from our elected representa-
tives, using a novel legal rationale that is not supported with the 
kind of argument and analysis of precedent that similar holdings 
have been, their distrust of the political branches is palpable. Fur-
thermore, when those who harshly criticize the Court’s opinion as 
lawless and unprincipled nonetheless defend it as a necessary protec-
tion against the chaos that they predict would have consumed the 
country,23 this analysis feeds the distrust of Congress already preva-
lent.  
 Congress is the least admired branch of government,24 and the 
signals that Justices and commentators are sending reinforce voters’ 
sense of alienation. We may well find that our distrust of politics has 
led to a self-fulfilling prophecy as fewer qualified people seek the of-
fice and those who do have little incentive to transcend the public’s 
                                                                                                                    
 21. See Garrett, supra note 13, at 39-40. 
 22. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 158 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[W]e do 
risk a self-inflicted wound—a wound that may harm not just the Court, but the Nation.”). 
But see Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89 
CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2001) (manuscript at 32-52) (arguing that the case does not 
have the characteristics that would cause long-term damage to the Court’s legitimacy). 
 23. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND 
THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 13, at 206-07. 
 24. See generally JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, CONGRESS AS PUBLIC 
ENEMY: PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS (1995) (summariz-
ing recent literature on voter dissatisfaction with Congress). 
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perception of them. As Congress becomes less important, more poli-
cies will be left to unelected judges who work in an institution poorly 
designed to make the choice between ex ante and ex post procedures 
or to craft comprehensive policies that can be modified and improved 
over time. 
 Second, this analysis suggests that institutions that are likely to 
play roles in political disputes, such as election contests, should 
adopt detailed ex ante frameworks before actual controversies arise. 
This lesson is an important one because, although political institu-
tions are increasingly using ex ante procedures (such as the federal 
budget process), they are still unusual even in circumstances where 
lawmakers have sufficient information to construct a relatively spe-
cific process before any actual controversy arises.  
 In the election context, election codes provide an ex ante blueprint 
to govern disputes. The additional information generated during the 
2000 election can help policymakers improve the rules governing 
elections without eliminating the advantage of the partial veil of ig-
norance. We discovered in November 2000 that current election codes 
have gaps or inconsistencies that should be resolved, if possible, 
through regulations and guidelines formulated by state officials be-
fore the identities and partisan affiliations of disputants are known. 
For example, many dismissed Secretary of State Harris’ interpreta-
tion of Florida election law governing extensions of the deadline for 
counties to submit vote totals because her ruling occurred in antici-
pation of litigation and when it was clear that her interpretation 
would benefit the candidate she had actively supported.25 Further-
more, it seems very unlikely that, until now, state legislatures had 
given a great deal of thought to the interaction of state election codes 
and the Electoral Count Act, including its safe harbor provision. 
Given the abbreviated time period for any contest of a presidential 
election, states should consider revising their laws to allow for expe-
dited procedures. Not only will moving quickly on these issues allow 
state institutions to act behind a partial veil of ignorance and thus 
avoid the temptation to advance the cause of particular candidates, it 
will also make clear to all who plan to run for office what the rules of 
the game will be so that they can plan their strategies accordingly. 
Modern campaigning is sufficiently sophisticated that changes in 
election laws are taken into account when allocating financial and 
human resources. 
                                                                                                                    
 25. The new Florida election law passed in the wake of the 2000 election requires the 
Secretary of State to promulgate standards for manual reviews of ballots before the next 
election. See Florida Election Reform Act of 2001, 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 40, § 42, at 149, 152 
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 102.166(6)(c) (2001)); Dana Canedy, A Ban on Punch Cards and a 
Lull in Division, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2001, at A8. 
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 For all elections, including presidential ones, legislatures and 
administrative officials must consider how the new equal protection 
right recognized by Bush v. Gore implicates the standards for dis-
cerning voter intent in election recounts, as well as how it affects 
other election processes that may vary from county to county.26 Al-
though the per curiam decision attempted to limit the holding only to 
the case before the Court (without much analysis justifying the limi-
tation), lawsuits are already being filed claiming that certain election 
practices result in unacceptable arbitrary and disparate treatment of 
the electorate.27 More broadly, all levels of government should take 
advantage of the increased salience of the issue of election reform to 
update their voting machines, analyze ballot design, and improve the 
system. Unfortunately, large-scale reform seems unlikely. Although 
Congress seems likely to pass legislation to encourage states to im-
prove election procedures and to provide money for upgrading voting 
systems,28 current efforts in most states have been characterized as 
“tinkering” rather than wholesale reform.29 Perhaps ironically, judi-
cial involvement may actually retard legislative reform as lawmakers 
are tempted to delay making difficult and costly choices until they 
can blame an activist judiciary for requiring extensive reforms. 
 Similarly, judicial intrusion into the 2000 election contest may 
have also reduced the chances for thoughtful reevaluation of the 
Twelfth Amendment along the lines suggested by Levinson and 
Young. They question the wisdom of requiring the House to vote by 
state when selecting a President; indeed, they argue that this “ulti-
mate stupidity” or “dysfunctionality” might well prompt a constitu-
tional crisis in the future.30 Had the 2000 contest wound up in Con-
gress, or gotten closer to that stage, the country might have focused 
on this problem, as well as on other troubling aspects of the constitu-
tional and statutory structure. Thus, it would have been more likely 
                                                                                                                    
 26. See Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal Protection Law in 
Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 377 (2001). 
 27. For example, a class action suit in Florida challenged the voting machines used by 
some counties using the rationale from Bush v. Gore. See Coyner v. Harris, (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 
2001), discussed at 69 U.S.L.W. 2408 (2001). This is only one of several such lawsuits that 
have been filed in the weeks following the Supreme Court’s decision. 
 28. See David E. Rosenbaum, Ending Impasse, Senate Leaders Agree to Overhaul Na-
tion’s Voting Systems, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2001, at A33. 
 29. See, e.g., Will Pinkston, Major Election Reform Falters as States Settle for Tinker-
ing, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 2001, at B17. Perhaps not surprisingly, Florida was one of the 
first states to pass comprehensive election reform and did so unanimously in the legisla-
ture and with the support of the Governor. The Florida reform bans butterfly ballots and 
punch cards and provides funds to counties for new voting equipment. See Canedy, supra 
note 25, at A8. In addition, Georgia has enacted comprehensive reform. See Paul M. 
Schwartz, Voting Technology and Democracy 46-51 (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with the Florida State Law University Review) (discussing Florida and Georgia Legisla-
tion). 
 30. See Levinson & Young, supra note 1, at 970-72. 
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that support for change would have developed. The impetus for the 
Electoral Count Act was the debacle of the Hayes-Tilden election and 
the strong desire to avoid designing structures of deliberation and 
decisionmaking in an ex post way; the more controlled ending to the 
Bush-Gore contest denies reform movements’ necessary vitality. 
II 
 The 2000 election provides a telling example of the opportunities 
for self-interested behavior in the absence of a relatively detailed ex 
ante framework that could constrain discretion and channel parti-
sanship. The Court took (or at least appeared to take) advantage of 
the opportunity provided to it by both an environment of vague stan-
dards—the Equal Protection Clause and Article II, Section 1, Clause 
2—and its fairly complete knowledge of how each decision would af-
fect the fortunes of Bush or Gore. Institutions of governance operate 
in a complex system of related institutions that act sequentially and 
simultaneously to shape outcomes. These institutions react to one 
another, and their reactions are anticipated and manipulated by 
other savvy political players. Manipulation can occur when later 
players in the political game signal how they will react, seeking to in-
fluence the moves of earlier players. Sometimes, these signals are 
truthful ones; in other cases, sophisticated players work to fool others 
with false signals that appear credible and that will influence the 
game in a particular direction. If the signals are credible, early play-
ers are likely to take account of them; in all cases, earlier players will 
try to anticipate the reactions of subsequent players so that the ulti-
mate resolution is closer to their policy preferences.31  
 This kind of institutional analysis allows us to reevaluate the 
influence of the first Supreme Court decision, Bush v. Palm Beach 
County Canvassing Board.32 It suggests that far from being an admi-
rable minimalistic intrusion early in the election dispute,33 this opin-
ion may have profoundly affected subsequent play so that the state 
institutions of Florida were effectively denied a chance to settle this 
contest.34 In part, this manipulation was possible because of the wide 
                                                                                                                    
 31. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, 
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 102-14 (2000) (describing institutional the-
ory and applying it to a case study of legislation). 
 32. 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per curiam). 
 33. For an argument that the first opinion was minimalistic, see Sunstein, supra note 
23. Others have viewed the opinion as more activist. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, In Defense of 
the Court’s Legitimacy, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 
13, at 223, 224-25 (approving of the Court’s decision to become involved). 
 34. Of course, no single decision was the sole determinant of the outcome in the 2000 
election. The decision of the state supreme court to extend the protest phase of the dispute 
had the effect of abbreviating the contest phase and allowed the majority in Bush v. Gore 
to halt any further recounts because so little time remained before the safe harbor date. 
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latitude provided by the doctrines that the Court could apply and the 
absence of any partial veil of ignorance or other mechanism (such as 
political accountability) that could reduce self-interested behavior. 
 Following the Florida Supreme Court’s decision to postpone the 
date of certification of vote totals,35 George W. Bush petitioned the 
Supreme Court to grant certiorari on three questions. The Court 
granted the petition with respect to two of the questions:36 “whether 
the decision of the Florida Supreme Court, by effectively changing 
the State’s elector appointment procedures after election day, vio-
lated . . . [the Electoral Count Act], and whether the decision of that 
court changed the manner in which the State’s electors are to be se-
lected, in violation of the legislature’s power to designate the manner 
for selection under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2 of the United States Constitu-
tion.”37 In addition, the Court asked the parties to consider the con-
sequences of a decision that the state supreme court’s decision did 
not comply with the federal safe harbor provision.38 The Court de-
clined to hear Bush’s claim that the manual recounts violated the 
Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.39 
The Court’s decision not to hear the equal protection and due process 
claims did not surprise many lawyers watching the proceedings; the 
constitutional claim was a novel one, concerning the “nuts-and-bolts” 
of election law that courts in the past had refused to entertain.40 
 The Court did not need to render any decision in this initial chal-
lenge to the 2000 presidential election. By the time of the argument 
in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, it was clear that 
the additional votes that were counted during the several days when 
certification had been delayed had not changed the outcome of the 
vote in Florida. Bush remained the winner. Although he had lost 393 
votes in his certified total, it was not clear whether this fact would 
have made a difference in the long run. If it did matter in a subse-
                                                                                                                    
The Gore team’s strategic decisions to ask for the extension of the protest period and to 
emphasize the importance of the December 12 date, which was only relevant to the safe 
harbor that would shape congressional consideration of objections to electors, were also 
crucial in shaping the way this event developed and concluded. My argument is only that 
the Court’s first decision—one that was unnecessary—played a substantial role in deter-
mining that Bush would be the forty-third President. 
 35. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1239-40 (Fla. 
2000), vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000). 
 36. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 1004, 1004 (2000) (granting 
writ of certiorari).  
 37. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 73.  
 38. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 1004.  
 39. Id. 
 40. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, & RICHARD H. PILDES, WHEN 
ELECTIONS GO BAD: THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2000, at 
85-94 (rev. ed. 2001); Hasen, supra note 26, at 377-78; see also Siegel v. LePore, 120 F. 
Supp. 2d 1041, 1048-50 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (holding that the manual recount did not violate 
Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses). 
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quent election contest, perhaps because the certified vote totals were 
given a presumption of correctness that votes found in subsequent 
recounts were not, courts could address the issue then. The best deci-
sion for the Court at this stage was to dismiss the petition for certio-
rari as improvidently granted and issue no opinion on the matter. 
But the Court did not choose this minimalistic route; instead it is-
sued a nine to zero per curiam opinion, full of heavy-handed hints 
about the Justices’ views on the substantive issues.41 This unfortu-
nate opinion shaped the rest of the judicial proceedings and, com-
bined with the refusal to grant certiorari on the equal protection 
claim, put the Florida Supreme Court in an untenable position. 
 A close reading of the per curiam opinion reveals several passages 
seemingly indicating how the Court might decide subsequent chal-
lenges based on Article II and the Electoral Count Act. First, the 
Court suggested that the context of a presidential election might re-
quire a change in its traditional deference to a state court’s interpre-
tation of a state statute.42 Citing McPherson v. Blacker,43 an opaque 
and hoary precedent without direct application to the question before 
the Court, the Court demanded clarification from the state supreme 
court “as to the extent to which the Florida Supreme Court saw the 
Florida Constitution as circumscribing the legislature’s authority 
under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2.”44 In a presidential election, the “direct grant 
of authority [to the state legislature] made under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, of 
the United States Constitution”45 might change the permissible 
bounds of judicial interpretation. The tone of the opinion suggests 
that the Court did not believe that a state constitution can circum-
scribe the behavior of a state legislature when it enacts laws govern-
ing presidential elections. Therefore, a state court cannot legiti-
mately rely on state constitutional principles to interpret unclear 
statutory language and might be limited in other ways that would af-
fect its interpretive task. Certainly, the Florida Supreme Court could 
have reasonably viewed these passages as warnings that its tradi-
tional approach to interpreting vague and ambiguous laws might be 
overly aggressive here and ultimately lead to a reversal by the 
United States Supreme Court. 
 The per curiam opinion discussed the safe harbor provision in the 
Electoral Count Act in the same ominous terms. The Justices ap-
peared to identify a “legislative wish to take advantage of the [Act’s] 
‘safe harbor’ [that] would counsel against any construction of the 
                                                                                                                    
 41. See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 70.  
 42. Id. at 76.  
 43. 146 U.S. 1 (1892). 
 44. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 78. 
 45. Id. at 76.    
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Election Code that Congress might deem to be a change in the law.”46 
The Court noted that the safe harbor provision assured finality to a 
state’s decision regarding electors if that decision was made “pursu-
ant to a state law in effect before the election.”47 The intimations of 
this passage are less clear than those found in the Court’s discussion 
of Article II. On the one hand, the Court placed great weight on sec-
tion 5 of the Electoral Count Act and referred to the Florida Legisla-
ture’s intent to take advantage of the safe harbor. Such an intent is 
probably fictive because it is very unlikely that those who drafted the 
state election code knew about the federal provision; indeed, the Fed-
eral Act was not mentioned in the state election code. The Supreme 
Court’s emphasis on the Electoral Count Act—which is better under-
stood as a rule of decision for Congress, not a mandate on state insti-
tutions—would make the Florida Supreme Court wary in subsequent 
opinions of any statutory interpretation that might be characterized 
as a change in law. On the other hand, the passage from the per cu-
riam opinion suggests that Congress would determine whether a 
state court decision violated the Electoral Count Act. This reference 
to congressional involvement could be understood as an acknowl-
edgment by the Court that Congress would be the key player in the 
rest of the election drama and a signal of reduced involvement by the 
federal judiciary in future developments. 
 How credible are all these signals? In hindsight, the clues about 
the Court’s view on the Article II issue led a majority of the state su-
preme court justices to draw inaccurate conclusions. Notwithstand-
ing the per curiam opinion’s hints that Article II would play a deci-
sive role in any subsequent decision, only three U.S. Justices were 
willing to sign an opinion deciding the case in favor of Bush on that 
ground.48 But the fact that nine Justices joined the first per curiam 
opinion, when the Court had the option of dismissing the case with-
out opinion, led to the reasonable conclusion that the Article II ar-
gument had some persuasive power. At the least, the state supreme 
court justices, who did not want their decisions to be reversed by the 
United States Supreme Court, believed that they had to tread warily 
and should refrain from their traditional methods of filling statutory 
gaps and interpreting a complex, sometimes contradictory state elec-
tion code. 
 It is evident from reading the two subsequent state court opinions 
that the U.S. Justices successfully bluffed the Florida jurists, at least 
on the Article II ground. In the revised decision extending the time 
for certification, the state supreme court wrote:  
                                                                                                                    
 46. Id. at 78. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111-15 (2000) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
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[O]ur construction of the above statutes results in the formation of 
no new rules of state law but rather results simply in a narrow 
reading and clarification of those statutes, which were enacted 
long before the present election took place. We decline to rule more 
expansively in the present case, for to do so would result in this 
Court substantially rewriting the Code. We leave that matter to 
the sound discretion of the body best equipped to address it, the 
Legislature.49  
 More crucially for the final outcome of the 2000 election, the state 
supreme court did not feel comfortable specifying standards to dis-
cern voter intent in a manual recount, even though justices at oral 
argument had expressed concerns about the varying standards used 
by the counties and the general level of expertise of those who would 
conduct and oversee the recount.50 Instead, the Florida Supreme 
Court adhered closely to the text of the statute, finding that the sole 
standard for a legal vote was based on a “clear indication of the in-
tent of the voter.”51 Its opinion gave no guidance to the lower court or 
to county officials regarding how to treat hanging, dimpled, or preg-
nant chads. More precise standards were surely possible; other states 
have enacted more detailed statutes governing manual recounts, al-
though most also include a catch-all provision that allows those 
counting the votes to consider other evidence of voter intent.52 But 
the Florida justices clearly worried that judicially-crafted guidelines 
would conflict with Article II and perhaps the federal statute, and it 
appeared that nine Justices credited these arguments. The equal 
protection analysis implicated by a failure to articulate standards 
was not deemed worthy of certiorari before, it was not an argument 
taken seriously by most knowledgeable commentators, and it seemed 
inconsistent with the ideology of a majority of Justices. 
                                                                                                                    
 49. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1291-92 (Fla. 
2000), vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000). 
 50. Arguments Before the Florida Supreme Court on the Presidential Recount, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 8, 2000, at A34.  
 51.  Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1283 (quoting FLA. 
STAT. § 101.5614(5)-(6) (2000)). 
 52. See, e.g., TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 127.130 (Vernon 2001). Such provisions are 
common ways to accommodate needs for flexibility when ex ante frameworks are applied to 
circumstances that drafters did not foresee. Interestingly, and perhaps understandably, 
the new Florida election code forbids the Secretary of State from including a catch-all pro-
vision in new regulations to govern manual recounts. Florida Election Reform Act, 2001 
Fla. Laws ch. 40, § 42(5)(b)(2), at 151-52 (amending FLA. STAT. § 102.166 (2000)). In his 
remarks at this symposium, Steve Bickerstaff expressed doubt that the standard for a 
manual recount could ever be entirely specified and offered his opinion that the ultimate 
standard was always a “clear indication of voter intent.” See also Schwartz, supra note 29, 
at 38. Nonetheless, it seems indisputable that more detailed instructions were possible and 
could have ensured greater uniformity across counties and across voting teams within 
counties. 
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 Thus, it was rational for the state justices to forego specifying 
standards for the manual recount, tailoring their opinion to survive 
review by the U.S. Supreme Court. Ironically, further specification of 
standards would not have been plagued by many of the problems 
that usually face ex post formulation of decision rules because it was 
not entirely clear which standards benefited which of the candidates. 
Clearly, any recount benefited the loser because it provided him the 
only chance to change the outcome. However, the effects of decisions 
structuring the manual review of the ballots were more uncertain. 
The results from the recounts were ambiguous; Gore did not seem to 
be picking up as many votes as his supporters had hoped for. More-
over, the state supreme court had ordered a statewide recount, not a 
manual recount limited to the counties Gore’s lawyers had cherry-
picked. There was a much more credible partial veil of ignorance 
with regard to determining the additional standards to govern a re-
count than would be possible at any subsequent stage in the judicial 
proceedings. 
 Had the state supreme court disregarded the signals in the first 
per curiam opinion and ordered that a recount conducted according 
to more rigorous standards be completed before December 12, the 
safe harbor date, or before December 18, the date on which electors 
cast their ballots, the decision in Bush v. Gore might have been un-
necessary. Perhaps the five Supreme Court Justices who joined the 
per curiam opinion were determined to end the election contest and 
short-circuit the political process and thus would have ruled for Bush 
no matter what the state supreme court did. (Indeed, the most ex-
perienced, and possibly more realistic, state supreme court justices 
dissented53 and would have halted the manual recounts, perhaps be-
cause they anticipated a loss in the United States Supreme Court re-
gardless of the state court’s analysis.) But in the absence of an equal 
protection or due process rationale, the Federal Justices would have 
had to base their decision on Article II or the Electoral Count Act. 
While those arguments are not compelling,54 a decision based on this 
reasoning would truly have been minimalistic, applying only in the 
                                                                                                                    
 53. Justice Shaw is the most senior member of the state supreme court, appointed in 
1983; he is followed in seniority by Justice Harding, appointed in 1991, and Justices Wells 
and Anstead, both appointed in 1994. Anstead joined the majority, which otherwise con-
sisted of justices appointed in 1997 or later. 
 54. For excellent analysis of the Article II argument, see Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. 
Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1413-25 (2001); 
James A. Gardner, The Regulatory Role of State Constitutional Structural Constraints in 
Presidential Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625 (2001). Other commentators have been 
more persuaded by the Article II argument. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, “In such Manner 
as the Legislature May Direct”: The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, in THE VOTE: 
BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 13, at 13; Richard A. Posner, Florida 
2000: A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the Election Deadlock and the Ensuing Litigation, 
2000 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 48-53.  
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context of presidential elections. Thus, the first intervention by the 
Supreme Court was decisive, shaping the subsequent play of state 
and federal actors and, perhaps, a spate of cases that will be brought 
and decided under the new equal protection rationale of Bush v. 
Gore. 
 The bottom line of this analysis is an institutional one. Players in 
the political process, unlike players in hypothetical games set up by 
scholars, act with imperfect information, and therefore they some-
times miscalculate. Such was the fate of the Florida Supreme Court. 
The state justices, as well as the four dissenting Federal Justices, 
may have been outsmarted by some wily Justices who included mis-
leading signals in the first per curiam opinion. Or, the Supreme 
Court may have acted too quickly and with too little analysis in the 
first per curiam opinion, not thinking how its decision would be un-
derstood by subsequent state actors.55 Whatever the reason—
whether as part of a strategy or as part of sloppiness brought on by 
haste—this episode in our political history provides a case study of 
the dynamic interactions of institutions of governance. It also dem-
onstrates what can happen when the decision environment allows 
players to act with substantial knowledge of their self-interest, 
rather than forcing them to act within a previously determined struc-
ture that reduces the influence of self-interest and requires political 
decisions to be made transparently by politically accountable repre-
sentatives. 
CONCLUSION 
 The real tragedy of the institutional miscalculations was not that 
the Florida Supreme Court was reversed but that Congress, the 
institution most suited to make any final determination in the event 
that the Florida dispute lingered through January 2001, was pre-
vented from playing that role. The one hint in the first per curiam 
opinion that was ignored by all—and correctly so—was that it would 
be the responsibility of Congress to determine whether Florida could 
take advantage of the Electoral Count Act’s safe harbor provision. 
Watching legislative deliberation on that issue would have been fas-
cinating because it might have revealed how members of Congress 
view the appropriate role of the judiciary in interpreting complex and 
poorly drafted statutes. Legislators, who have a more sophisticated 
understanding of the legislative process and legislative drafting than 
most judges, have distinct views on the appropriate interpretive 
                                                                                                                    
 55. David Strauss seems to suggest that the errors in the Court’s early reasoning 
were due to haste, rather than strategy. See David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were 
They Thinking?, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 13, at 
184-85. 
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method, and this debate, as well as other deliberation, would have 
been illuminating for the country, for judges, and for politicians.  
 The Court’s aggressive stance in the 2000 election denied us the 
opportunity to learn how Congress—if congressional involvement 
had been necessary—would have behaved in an environment shaped 
by an ex ante framework for decisionmaking. It may well also deny 
us the chance, in light of new information from the 2000 election, to 
formulate and refine other ex ante structures that could head off 
election contests at all levels. Instead, the Court’s analysis and ac-
tions reinforced the unfortunate tendency of our political branches to 
rely on the unelected federal judiciary to step in and save us from the 
“chaos” of democracy. A more responsible judiciary would act so as to 
invigorate the political system, not marginalize it. 
 
